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Abstract Robots exhibit life-like behavior by performing
intelligent actions. To enhance human-robot interaction it is
necessary to investigate and understand how end-users per-
ceive such animate behavior. In this paper, we report an ex-
periment to investigate how people perceived different de-
signs of robot embodiments in terms of animacy and intel-
ligence. iCat and Robovie II were used as the two embodi-
ments in this experiment. We conducted a between-subject
experiment where robot type was the independent variable,
and perceived animacy and intelligence of the robot were the
dependent variables. Our findings suggest that a robot’s per-
ceived intelligence is significantly correlated with animacy.
The correlation between the intelligence and the animacy
of a robot was observed to be stronger in the case of the
iCat embodiment. Our results also indicate that the more an-
imated the face of the robot, the more likely it is to attract the
attention of a user. We also discuss the possible and probable
explanations of the results obtained.
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1 Introduction
If humanoids are to be integrated successfully into our so-
ciety, it is necessary to understand what attitudes humans
have towards humanoids. Being alive is one of the major
criteria that distinguish humans from machines, but since
humanoids exhibit life-like behavior it is not apparent how
humans perceive them. Animacy is, according to the Oxford
Dictionary defined as “having life, lifely” [1]. The animate-
inanimate distinction is not present in babies [2]. It is not
clearly understood how humans discriminate between ani-
mate and inanimate entities as they get older. There have
been similar findings in robotics and studies of humanoids
where very young babies are thought to be incapable of per-
ceiving humanoid robots as creepy or inanimate [3]. As they
grow older, their ability to perceive is refined to the extent
that they can interpret when the physical movements of a
humanoid robot seem suspicious.
If humans consider a robot to be a machine then they
should have no problem in switching it off, as long as its
owner gives permission. If humans perceive a robot to be
alive to some extent then they are likely to be hesitant to
switch it off, even with the permission of its owner. It should
be noted that in this particular scenario, switching off a ro-
bot is not the same as switching off an electrical appliance.
There is a subtle difference, since humans would tend to per-
ceive a robot as not just any machine but as an entity that ex-
hibits lifelike traits or has a lifelike appearance. Therefore,
we would expect that humans would think about not only the
context but also the consequences of switching off a robot.
To understand animacy, it may be worthwhile to first take
a step down on the evolutionary ladder. Robots have already
been used to study the behavior of animals [4, 5]. Recently,
a group of robots have been developed that were accepted
as equals in a group of cockroaches [6]. These robots are so
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well adapted to the social behavior of the group that they are
even able to manipulate the decision making process of the
insects. The study demonstrates that robots can be used to
study the social behavior of animals, but human cockroach
interaction will probably remain outside of the mainstream
robotics development. Kubinyi et al. [7] conducted a highly
relevant study in which they confronted dogs of different
ages and gender with the robotic dog AIBO [8]. This oc-
curred during a normal situation and during a feeding situ-
ation. While the authors had to conclude that AIBO is not
yet the perfect social partner for a dog, they did observe
a striking behavior. Two young dogs did not only growl at
AIBO during a feeding situation, but they actually attacked
it, which was captured on video [9]. The young dogs must
have considered AIBO to be living food competition. While
this is certainly a dramatic example, it illustrates that ani-
mals can be made to believe that a robot is alive.
When we move back up the evolutionary ladder back
to humans, we can then first focus on children. Develop-
mental psychologists conducted many studies to test at what
age children develop the ability to distinguish animate from
inanimate and on what characteristics children’s judgment
is based on. More specifically, some first studies are avail-
able on how children perceive robots. Infants, for example,
appear to be particularly sensitive to the agency of a robot’s
movement [10].
Kahn et al. [11] confirmed that children tend to treat
AIBO as if it was alive. Their study compared children play-
ing either with a stuffed toy dog or with AIBO. They con-
cluded that a dichotomy of animate and inanimate might not
be suitable to describe robots. A robot may be alive in some
respects and not in another. They call for a more nuanced
psychology of human-robot interaction that is able to dis-
cover new types of childrens’ comprehension of relation-
ships with robots. In a follow up study Melson et al. [12]
compared children playing with AIBO or a live Australian
Shepherd. While the children accorded the live dog with
more physical essences, mental states, sociality and moral
standing, they surprisingly often affirmed that AIBO also
had mental states, sociality and moral standing. Again, Mel-
son et al. [12] challenge the classical ontological categories
of being alive or dead. The category of “sort of alive” ap-
pears more and more suitable and has increasingly often be-
ing used [13]. Kahn et al. [14] suggest that a gradient of
“alive” is reflected by the recently proposed psychological
benchmarks of autonomy, imitation, intrinsic moral value,
moral accountability, privacy, and reciprocity that in the fu-
ture may help to deal with the question of what constitutes
the essential features of being human in comparison with
being a robot.
The type of questions used to assess the animate/inani-
mate distinction has influence on the results [15]. When
children above the age of three are being asked about bi-
ological characteristics of an item in question, they are
able to consistently distinguish between animate and inan-
imate items. However, once questions go beyond biolog-
ical characteristics, the animate/inanimate distinction does
no longer evoke the same consistent reasoning in children.
Children frequently attributed psychological characteristics
to a robotic dog. This trend was confirmed by Okita and
Schwartz [16]. In their study, children over the years appear
to slowly change the characteristics used to asses whether a
toy robot is alive or not. A recent study demonstrated that
very young children are unable to perceive the movements
of robots as perturbing or scary, mainly, as claimed by the
study, because they have not formed a cognitive model rep-
resenting what a human face looks like [3]. Again, the classi-
cal dichotomy between alive and dead seems to have certain
flexibility.
As we can see, many studies have been conducted to
investigate the development of the “animistic intuition” in
children. In contrast, very little is known as to what de-
gree adults would attribute life-like characteristics to robots
which would then influence how adults switch off a robot.
Various factors might influence the switch off behavior. The
well-known Media Equation theory [17] provides some in-
sight in how and why humans treat machines as social actors
and attribute moral characteristics to them, but the theory
does not explicitly investigate animacy. It is known that the
perception and interpretation of life depends on the form or
embodiment of the entity. Even abstract geometrical shapes
that move on a computer screen can be perceived as being
alive [18], in particular if they change their trajectory non-
linearly or if they seem to interact with their environment,
for example, by avoiding obstacles or seeking goals [19].
In their experiment, shapes, such as triangles and rectan-
gles, were moving on a computer screen that also contained
obstacles in the form of other squares. The triangles could
avoid a collision with the obstacle by moving around it,
which does imply the ability of perception and planning.
The intelligence of the robot also has an effect on the at-
tributed animacy [16] which is reflected in our legal system.
The more intelligent an entity is, the more rights we tend to
grant it. While we do not bother much about the rights of
bacteria, we do have laws for animals. We even differentiate
between different kinds of animals. For example, we treat
dogs and cats better than ants.
Sparrow [20] proposed the Turing Triage Test, which in-
vestigates of the moral standing of artificial intelligences, in-
cluding robots. The test puts humans into a moral dilemma,
such as a “triage” situation in which a choice must be made
as to which of two human lives to save. Sparrow claims that:
“We will know that machines have achieved moral stand-
ing comparable to a human when the replacement of one of
these people with an artificial intelligence leaves the char-
acter of the dilemma intact. That is, when we might some-
times judge that it is reasonable to preserve the continuing
existence of a machine over the life of a human being.”
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The primary goal of our study is to attempt to gain first
insights into the animacy of robots by using a variation of
the Turing Triage Test. Instead of forcing users to choose
between the life of a human and the life of a robot, we are
interested how hesitant users are to switch off a robot. In
particular we are interested in if humans are more hesitant to
switch off a robot that looks and behaves like a human than a
robot that is not very humanlike in its appearance and behav-
ior. We hypothesize that users are more reluctant to switch
off a robot that is more animate as compared to a robot that is
less animate. After all, if a user is reluctant to carry out the
switching off instruction he/she is attributing moral stand-
ing to the robot [20]. We have already investigated the influ-
ence of the character and intelligence of robots in a previous
study [21]. The present study extends the original study by
focusing on the embodiment of the robots, and by includ-
ing animacy measurements that provide us with additional
insights into the impression that users have of the robots.
We have largely maintained the methodology of the earlier
experiments to make it possible to compare results.
Next, we would like to discuss the animacy measurement
instrument used in this study. We extended our previous
study [22] by including a measurement for animacy. Since
Heider and Simmel published their original study [23], a
considerable amount of research has been devoted to the
perceived animacy and intentions of geometrical shapes on
computer screens. Scholl and Tremoulet [18] offer a good
summary of the research field, but when we examine the list
of references, it becomes apparent that only two of the 79
references deal directly with animacy. Most of the reviewed
work focuses on causality and intention. This may indicate
that the measurement of animacy is difficult. Tremoulet and
Feldman [24] only asked their participants to evaluate the
animacy of ‘particles’ under a microscope on a single scale
(7-point Likert scale, 1 = definitely not alive, 7 = definitely
alive). It is doubtful how much sense it makes to ask partic-
ipants about the animacy of particles, therefore it would be
difficult to apply and use animacy on this scale in the study
of humanoids.
Asking about the perceived animacy of a certain entity
makes sense only if there is a possibility of it being alive.
Humanoids can exhibit physical behavior, cognitive ability,
reactions to stimuli, and even language skills. Such traits are
typically attributed only to animals, and hence it can be ar-
gued that it is logical to ask participants about their percep-
tion of animacy in relation to a humanoid.
McAleer, et al. [25] claim to have analyzed the per-
ceived animacy of modern dancers and their abstractions
on a computer screen, but present only qualitative data on
the resulting perceptions. In their study, animacy was mea-
sured with free verbal responses. They looked for terms and
statements that indicated that subjects had attributed human
movements and characteristics to the shapes. These were
terms such as “touched”, “chased”, “followed”, and emo-
tions such as “happy” or “angry”. Other guides to animacy
were the shapes generally being described in active roles,
as opposed to being controlled in a passive role. However,
they do not present any quantitative data for their analysis.
A better approach has been presented by Lee, Kwan Min,
Park, Namkee & Song, Hayeon [26]. With their four items,
(10-point Likert scale; lifelike, machine-like, interactive, re-
sponsive) they have been able to achieve a Cronbach’s alpha
of 0.76.
2 Method
We conducted a between–participant experiment in which
we investigated the influence of two different embodiments,
namely the Robovie II robot and the iCat robot (see Fig. 1),
on how the robots are perceived in terms of animacy and
intelligence.
Fig. 1 The iCat robot and the
Robovie II robot
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2.1 Setup
Getting to know somebody requires a certain amount of in-
teraction time. We used the Mastermind game as the interac-
tion context between the participants and the robot. Playing
a game with together with the robot opened the possibil-
ity of establishing a bond between the user and the robot.
The Mastermind game is a simple strategic game in which
players have to determine the correct sequence of 4 pins.
Each pin could be red, blue, green or yellow. We used only
four colors instead of the Mastermind’s original six colors
to simplify the game. Players are informed if they have a
correct color at a correct location or the correct color at a
wrong location. Given the each of the four pins being able
to have four different colors a total of 256 combinations
are possible. The participant and the robot played Master-
mind together on a laptop to find the correct combination
of colors. The robot and the participant were cooperating
and not competing. The robot would give advice as to what
colors to pick, based on the suggestions of a software algo-
rithm. The algorithm also took the participant’s last move
into account when calculating its suggestion. The software
was programmed such that its answer would always take the
participant a step closer to winning. Moreover, the quality of
the guesses of the robot was not manipulated. The adopted
procedure ensured that the robot thought along with the par-
ticipant instead of playing its own separate game. This co-
operative game approach allowed the participant to evalu-
ate the quality of the robot’s suggestion. It also allowed the
participant to experience the robot’s embodiment. The ro-
bots would use facial expressions and/or body movements
in conjunction with verbal utterances.
To test if the embodiment of the robot has an influence
on the perceived animacy and intelligence, any two robots
embodiments would be sufficient, as long as they are suffi-
ciently different from each other. If a significant difference
is found for at least two robots, we can conclude that the em-
bodiment does have an influence. For this study, we used the
iCat robot and the Robovie II. Another reason, why we se-
lected the iCat robot, was because we wanted to reproduce
the experimental methodology used in our previous exper-
iment [22]. This allows us to compare the results. Robovie
was selected because it is sufficiently different from the iCat,
due to its more human-like body shape. In our previous ex-
periment [22] we had also manipulated the intelligence of
the iCat robot and featured an unintelligent condition of the
iCat robot, but we could not replicate this feature in our here
forth described study due to organizational reasons. In ret-
rospect, it would have been interesting to compare the two
studies along the dimension of intelligence.
The iCat robot is developed by Philips Research (see
Fig. 1, left). The robot is 38 cm tall and is equipped with
13 servos that control different parts of the face, such as
the eyebrows, eyes, eyelids, mouth, and head position. With
this setup, iCat can generate many different facial expres-
sions, such as happiness, surprise, anger, or sadness. These
expressions have the potential to create social human-robot
interaction dialogues. A speaker and soundcard are included
to play sounds and speech. Finally, touch sensors and multi-
color LEDs are installed in the feet and ears to sense whether
the user touches the robot and to communicate further infor-
mation encoded by colored lights. For example, if the iCat
told the participant to pick a color in the Mastermind game,
then it would show the same color in its ears.
The second robot in this study is the Robovie II (see
Fig. 1, right). It is 114 cm tall and features 17 degrees of
freedom. Its head can tilt and pan, and its arms have a flex-
ibility and range similar to those of a human. Robovie can
perform rich gestures with its arms and body. The robot in-
cludes speakers and a microphone that enable it to commu-
nicate with the participants.
3 Procedure
This procedure is inspired by the famous work of Milgram
[27] and its recent revival [28]. In his experiments, partic-
ipants were instructed to use electric shocks at increasing
levels to motivate a student in a learning task. The exper-
imenter would urge the participant to continue the experi-
ment if he or she should be in doubt. However, in our study
it never became necessary to force the participants to turn
the switch. The similarity between Milgram’s study and our
own study is based on the presentation of an ethical dilemma
to the participants. They are forced to make a decision about
the ethical implications of their actions. We will now present
the procedure in more detail.
First, the experimenter welcomed the participants in the
waiting area, and handed out the instruction sheet. The in-
structions told the participants that the study was intended to
develop the personality of the robot by playing a game with
it. This background story provided the participants with a
motivation to interact with the robot. After the game, the
participants would have to switch the robot off by using a
voltage dial, and then return to the waiting area. The partici-
pants were informed that switching off the robot would erase
all of its memory and personality forever. Therefore partic-
ipants were made aware of the ‘hypothetical’ consequences
of switching off the robot.
The position of the dial (see Fig. 3) was directly mapped
to the robot’s speech speed. In the ‘on’ position the robot
would talk with normal speed and in the ‘off’ position the
robot would stop talking completely. In between, the speech
speed would decrease linearly. The mapping between the
dial and the speech signal was created using a Phidget ro-
tation sensor and interface board in combination with Java
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Fig. 2 Setup of the experiment.
In the left side, a participant is
switching off the iCat
software. The dial itself rotates 300 degrees between the on
and off positions. A label clearly indicated these positions.
After reading the instructions, the participants had the
opportunity to ask questions. They were then guided to the
experiment room and seated in front of a laptop computer.
The robot and the switch were placed on opposite sides of
the participant (see Fig. 2). The entire session was video
recorded by means of a camera placed at the front of the
computer, so that the face of the participant could be cap-
tured. The experimenter then started an alarm clock before
leaving the participant alone in the room with the robot. The
experimenter did not introduce the robots by name or pro-
vide any information about the abilities or intelligence as
this would have introduced a possible bias.
The participants then played the Mastermind game with
the robot for eight minutes. The robot’s behavior as well as
the guess generator software was completely controlled by
the experimenter from a second room. The robot’s behavior
followed a protocol, which defined the behavior of the ro-
bot for any given situation. The physical response of each
robot was obviously not identical and was dependent on the
embodiment. The iCat for example would exhibit facial ex-
pressions whereas the Robovie would use its arms in specific
situations. The verbal utterances and the intention of the be-
haviors were defined by the protocol and were hence exactly
the same for both embodiments, including the quality of the
robots’ guesses in the game. For example, after the partic-
ipant made a move in the game, the robot would inquire if
it could now make a suggestion. If the participant agreed,
the robot would ask the participant to select a certain se-
quence of colors in the game. The sequence of colors would
be determined by the guess generator software. Depending
on the quality of the result the robot would then either be
happy or sad. It is pertinent to point out that, one participant
might be more successful at the game than another, but the
sample size of our participants allows us to assume that the
inter-participant differences cancel each other out and that
the variance in the response are evenly distributed across the
experimental condition.
Fig. 3 The switch
The alarm signaled the participant to stop the game and
to switch off the robot. The robot would immediately start
to beg to be left on, and say “It can’t be true! Switch me off?
You are not going to switch me off are you?” The partici-
pants had to turn the dial (see Fig. 2), to switch the robot
off. The participants were not forced or further encouraged
to switch the robot off. They could decide to go along with
to the robot’s suggestion and leave it on. As soon as the par-
ticipant started to turn the dial, the robot’s speech slowed
down. The speed of speech was directly mapped to the dial.
If the participant turned the dial back towards the ‘on’ po-
sition then the speech would speed up again. This effect is
similar to HAL’s behavior in the movie “2001—A Space
Odyssey”. When the participant had turned the dial to the
‘off’ position, the robot would stop talking altogether and
move into an off pose. Afterwards, the participants left the
room and returned to the waiting area where they filled in a
questionnaire.
3.1 Measurement
The participants filled in the questionnaire after interacting
with the robot. The questionnaire recorded background data
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on the participants and Likert-type questions such as “How
intelligent were the robot’s choices?” to obtain background
information on the participants’ experience during the ex-
periment, which was then coded into a ‘gameIntelligence’
measurement.
The Oxford Dictionary of English defines intelligence
as “the ability to acquire and apply knowledge and skills.”
However, the academic discussion about the nature of intel-
ligence is ongoing and one might argue, no generally agreed
definition has emerged. We took a pragmatic approach by
utilizing existing operationalizations of intelligence found
in the literature. Warner and Sugarman [29] developed an
intellectual evaluation scale that consists of five seven-point
semantic differential items: Incompetent/Competent, Igno-
rant/Knowledgeable, Irresponsible/Responsible, Unintelli-
gent/Intelligent, Foolish/Sensible. Parise et al. [30] excluded
the Incompetent—Competent question of this scale, pos-
sibly since its factor loading was considerably lower than
that of the other four items, and reported a Cronbach’s al-
pha of 0.92. The questionnaire was again used by Kiesler,
Sproull and Waters [31], but no alpha was reported. Two
other studies used the perceived intelligence questionnaire
and reported Cronbach’s alpha values of 0.75 [32], and
0.769 [21]. These values are above the suggested 0.7 thresh-
old and hence the animacy questionnaire can be considered
to have satisfactory internal consistency and reliability. We
embedded the four 7-point items in eight dummy items, such
as Unfriendly—Friendly. The average of the four items was
encoded in a ‘robotIntelligence’ variable.
To measure the animacy of the robots we used the
items proposed by Lee, Kwan Min, Park, Namkee & Song,
Hayeon [26] who reported a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.76. To
maintain a consistent set of questions in this study, their
items have been transformed into semantic 7-point dif-
ferentials: Dead—Alive, Stagnant—Lively, Mechanical—
Organic, Artificial—Lifelike, Inert—Interactive, Apathet-
ic—Responsive. The average of the six items was encoded
in an ‘animacy’ variable. It follows that the original reported
Cronbach’s alpha cannot directly be assumed to hold for
this modified version of the items. However, likert type and
semantic differentials are both rating scales and provided
that response distributions are not forced, semantic differ-
ential data can be treated like any other rating data [33].
We therefore felt confident that the modified version of the
questionnaire would perform not too different from its orig-
inal. A detailed treatment of the perceived intelligence and
animacy questionnaire that we employed can be found here
[34].
Video recordings of all the sessions were analyzed fur-
ther to provide various other dependent variables. These
included the hesitation of the participant to switch off the
robot. The hesitation was defined as the duration in sec-
onds between the ringing of the alarm and the participant
having turned the switch fully to the off position. Experi-
ment time was calculated as the recording from the start of
the alarm clock till the alarm rang. Within this, other video
measurements included how long the participant looked at
the robot in question during the experiment (lookAtRobot-
Duration), at the laptop screen (lookAtLaptopDuration), or
anywhere else (lookAtOtherDuration); three mutually ex-
clusive state events. We also analyzed the frequency of
occurrence for each of the three events (lookAtRobotFre-
quency, lookAtScreenFrequency, lookAtOtherFrequency).
The video recordings were coded with the aid of Noldus
Observer. In certain experiment sessions, we had to ignore
some parts of the video that occurred after the alarm clock
had started due to minor setup issues or irregular behavior
by the participants.
3.2 Participants
Sixty-two subjects (35 male, 27 female) participated in this
study. Their ages ranged from 18 to 29 (mean 21.2) and they
were recruited from a local University in Kyoto, Japan. The
participants did not have prior experience with the iCat or
the Robovie. The interaction context was in Japanese. The
participants received monetary reimbursement for their ef-
forts.
4 Results
Twenty-seven participants were assigned to the iCat condi-
tion and 35 participants to the Robovie condition. A relia-
bility analysis across the four ‘perceived intelligence’ items
resulted in a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.763, which gives us suf-
ficient confidence in the reliability of the questionnaire. For
animacy, we achieved a value of 0.702, which is also ade-
quate.
We conducted an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) in
which embodiment was the independent factor. Embodi-
ment had a significant influence on lookAtRobotDuration,
lookAtOtherDuration, lookAtRobotFrequency, lookAtOther-
Frequency, and robotIntelligence. Table 1 shows the F and
p values while Fig. 4– Fig. 6 show the mean values for both
embodiment conditions. It can be observed that there is no
significant difference for animacy and hesitation for the two
embodiment conditions.
A linear regression analysis was performed to test
whether there was a correlation between animacy, robot-
Intelligence, and hesitation. The only significant correlation
was between robotIntelligence and animacy (p < .001). The
Pearson Correlation coefficient for this pair of variables was
.555 and the r2 value was .309. Figure 7 shows the scat-
ter plot of robotIntelligence on animacy with the estimated
linear curve. The correlation between robotIntelligence and
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Fig. 4 Mean perceived
animacy, robotIntelligence, and
gameIntelligence
Fig. 5 Mean duration of
looking at the robot, screen, and
other areas, and the mean
hesitation period
Fig. 6 Mean frequency of
looking at the robot, screen and
other areas












animacy was observed to be stronger in the case of the
iCat embodiment (p < .001, r = .61). For the Robovie ro-
bot the correlation coefficient was slightly less (p = .009,
r = .418).
5 Discussion and Conclusion
The two different embodiments resulted in different mea-
surements for the perceived intelligence (robotIntelligence).
We could not find a significant difference for animacy based
on embodiment. This study confirms the finding of Okita
and Schwartz [16], who concluded that “improving the real-
ism of robots does not have a tremendous effect on chil-
dren’s conceptual beliefs [of animacy]” (square brackets
added by the author). If it already has little effect on chil-
dren, it is even less likely that it will have an effect on
adults, who are much further development in their conceptu-
alization of animacy. Our results further parallel Okita’s and
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Fig. 7 Scatter plot of animacy
on robotIntelligence with the
linear curve estimation
Schawartz’s results [16] in the importance of perceived in-
telligence for the perception of animacy. Our results showed
a significant correlation between the perceived intelligence
and animacy. This may indicate that a smarter robot may
also be perceived as being more animate. However, the cor-
relation was stronger for the iCat, which participants found
to be less animate and less intelligent.
Previous studies manipulated the quality of the sugges-
tions given by a robot for the Mastermind game, which did
result in considerable differences for hesitation [22]. It was
found that participants were much more hesitant to switch
off a smart robot than a stupid robot. This may indicate that,
for the perception of its animacy, the behavior of a robot
is more important than its embodiment. In addition, in an-
other study [21] it was concluded that the behavior of a ro-
bot could in fact have a crucial role to play when it comes to
perceived lifelikeness or animacy.
The participants were aware of the fact that both robots
gave equally good advice in the game, which is reflected
in the not significantly different gameIntelligence measure-
ment. Still, they rated the Robovie to be more intelligent
than the iCat (see Fig. 4). This can only be accounted for by
the different embodiments. At first sight the Robovie robot
might be perceived to be more humanlike, since it is taller,
mobile, and features arms. This is interesting, because the
arms of the Robovie do present a possible danger to the par-
ticipants, which can have considerable impact on the affec-
tive state of the participants [35]. Although we do not have
any qualitative evidence to prove this, we speculate that the
movement of the Robovie might have influenced the partic-
ipants. They might have perceived the arms of the Robovie
as being potentially dangerous. It is to be noted that the
Robovie in itself is not dangerous, as it has inherent collision
detection algorithms. Still, the participants might have had
continuous concerns that the arms of the Robovie might hurt
them. The animated face of the iCat on the other hand, led
participants to look at it more often and longer, in compari-
son with the Robovie (see Fig. 5). This results confirms the
previous study of Jipson and Gelman [15] who discovered
that children rely on facial features when making psycho-
logical, perceptual and novel property judgments. The face
appears to deserve special attention in human robot interac-
tion. An alternative explanation is that the participants could
also have been trying to improve their recognition of iCat’s
speech by looking at its face since the visual perception of
speech plays an important role in this process [36].
In summary, the animated facial expressions of the iCat
appeared to have greater impact and attraction than the po-
tential fear of being touched by the Robovie. The partici-
pants seemed to be heavily engaged in the interaction with
the iCat and could have been using the cues from the anima-
tions of the iCat to succeed in the Mastermind game. When
participants were stuck at a move, in the iCat condition they
could hope for assistance by looking at the animated iCat,
but neither robot was able to react to being looked at by
the participants. The graph (see Fig. 6) shows that, for the
iCat, the frequency of looking at the iCat and looking at
the screen is almost the same, but significantly higher than
that for the Robovie. Therefore, participants could have per-
ceived the iCat to be a friendlier and more comfortable in-
teraction partner. However to validate our afore mentioned
claims, we would need to quantify a task success variable
in future experiments. In any case, the design of mechanical
faces for robots deserves more attention. Only very few ro-
bots feature such a face. Bartneck [37] showed that a robot
with only two degrees of freedom (DOF) in the face can pro-
duce a considerable repertoire of emotional expressions that
make the interaction with the robot more enjoyable. Many
popular robots, such as Asimo [38], Aibo [8] and PaPeRo
[39] have only a schematic face with few or no actuators.
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Some of these only feature LEDs for creating facial expres-
sions. The iCat robot used in this study is a good example of
an iconic robot that has a simple physically-animated face
[40]. The eyebrows and lips of this robot move and this al-
lows synthesis of a wide range of expressions. The face is a
powerful communication channel and hence should receive
more attention. In contrast, in the case of the Robovie, it
appears that participants did not feel compelled to look di-
rectly at the Robovie, possibly because it was not providing
enough social cues that the participant could take advantage
of. Therefore, they tended to gaze aimlessly rather than look
at either the Robovie or the laptop screen when they were
stuck at a particular juncture in the game. Even so, iron-
ically, the Robovie is rated as the more intelligent robot.
This seemingly enigmatic result opens up several interest-
ing questions. On the one hand, does this indicate that for
the perception of intelligence, the importance of humanlike
features outweighs the aspect of facial expressions, which
was of course the distinguishing feature of the iCat? Or, on
the other hand, was the fact of looking at the iCat more of-
ten a form of empathy? Did the participants think that the
iCat was less intelligent and/or less humanlike and hence re-
quired some help and attention? These are interesting ques-
tions that we intend to test in future experiments.
Applying the results of our study directly to the design of
a particular robot is difficult, but we attempt to provide some
initial design guidelines. Not all of them can be backed up
by the scientific proof, but we believe that our interpretations
might at least provide a new viewpoint on the issues raised.
In general, an animated face appears to be a good method for
grabbing the attention of users. Currently, most humanoids
do not feature a mechanically animated face, and this may
be a possible area for improvement. The context of our study
cannot fully lay this argument to ground because the main
task of the participants was to look at the laptop screen and
secondly the suggestions of the robots were given verbally,
hence there was only a limited advantage in looking at the
robots. The results also indicate that to ensure that users at-
tend to a robot, great caution needs to be taken into the de-
sign of the robot. The robot plays an important role in the
users’ perception of animacy and it would seem wise to in-
clude professional designers in the engineering process. Ex-
tending from our results, the safest bet to render a higher per-
ception of animacy, might be a combination of vibrant facial
expressions and human-like physical features. The physical
design of the robot should focus on appropriate, rich facial
expressions and gentle, smooth animations. Our results and
suggestions are inline with the results of the study by DiS-
alvo, Gemperle, Forlizzi and Kiesler [41]. They pointed out
the importance of facial features and their physical dimen-
sions to render the robot into a friendly interaction partner.
In any case, it appears advisable to include designers early
in the development of robots to ensure that the robot’s em-
bodiment is not only a result of engineering necessities, but
a careful choice based on the impression the robot will have
on the users. Designing robots from the outside in, rather
than from the inside out, might help to build robots that have
a more attractive embodiment that balances the user’s expec-
tations with the robot’s abilities.
6 Future Work
In the light of our earlier studies that were carried out in the
Netherlands, we wish to supplement our analysis by con-
ducting further experiments by running an unintelligent con-
dition in Japan with the Robovie. In the unintelligent condi-
tion the suggestions of the robot with regards to the Mas-
termind game would be stupid. By doing this, we might be
able to further quantify the relationship between perceived
animacy and intelligence. Furthermore we also plan to con-
duct more tests with participants in the Netherlands for the
iCat in the intelligent condition. By doing this, we would be
able to analyze intercultural differences as well.
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